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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS
ACT OF 1988: PUTTING THE BRAKES
ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The proposed $225 million acquisition of Fairchild Semiconduc-
tors by Fujitsu, Ltd. in January 1981 created a wave of fear in
the United States that key industrial sectors in this country were
about to fall under foreign control.' The reflexive reaction of Con-
gress came five months later in the form of a protectionist proposal
to allow the President to ban direct foreign investment in the
American economy. 2 This proposal contradicted 200 years of prior
American policy towards direct foreign investment. It has always
been the policy of the United States to freely admit foreign in-
vestment in this country and to treat foreign investors equally with
domestic investors once they have entered the American market.
Few special incentives have been offered, and with a few inter-
nationally recognized exceptions, barriers to investments have not
been imposed.3 Virtually all other countries in the world have
adopted limitations on direct foreign investment. Through the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and bilateral
treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation (FCNs), the United
States has worked to reduce foreign barriers to investment, and to
create an environment conducive to free and fair international
trade.4
The large influx into the United States of Arab petrodollars in
the mid-1970s spurred Congress to enact legislation that provided
for the monitoring and reporting of the extent of foreign investment
in the United States by industrial sector and nation of origin.5 The
See S. REP. No. 80, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1987) [hereinafter TECHNOLOGY
ACT].
2 Id. at 6.
3 See Foreign Investment Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 425 Before the Subcomm.
on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 71 (1975) [hereinafter Hearings of 1975].
4 See infra notes 28-30.
See infra note 42.
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establishment of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS) to administer this new safeguard supplemented ex-
isting regulations protecting the aviation, banking, communications,
defense, energy, mineral and shipping industries. 6
Despite already-existing Presidential power to ban foreign tak-
eovers in an emergency, Congress reacted to the attempted takeover
of Fairchild by proposing broad new powers for the President. 7
These powers would have allowed the President to ban various
forms of foreign investment if the investment affected "essential
commerce" of the United States.' Reaction against such sweeping
powers was strong and swift. 9 Critics of the restraints argued that
currently available measures were sufficient to protect key industries
from foreign takeovers. 0 Additionally, it was argued, such restraints
would be counterproductive: first, a major chilling of direct foreign
investment in the United States would occur;" second, retaliation
against future American investment abroad and harassment of cur-
rent American ventures overseas would result; 2 finally, the restraints
would adversely affect efforts to reduce other nations' barriers to
free investment and trade generally. 3
Responding to this backlash, Congress scaled back' 4 the proposed
legislation to allow the President, where current regulations were
insufficient, to suspend or prohibit any acquisition, merger or take-
over by a foreign person or entity if such foreign control threatened
6 See infra notes 31-38.
7 See TECHNOLOGY ACT, supra note 1, at 5.
1 See Acquisitions By Foreign Companies: Hearings on S. 907 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 25
(1987)[hereinafter Acquisitions].
9 Id. at 8.
10 See infra notes 107-112.
" See infra notes 92-93.
12 See Foreign Investment in the United States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs,
93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 61 (1974) [hereinafter Investment Hearings of 1974]:
International investment is a seamless web. We can not block it in one direction
without impeding its flow in all directions. We will not be able to establish
significant barriers to foreign investment in the United States without risking
the imposition of restrictions on our investments abroad and impairing our
ability to contribute to development and resource creation and stability through-
out the world. (Statement of William Casey, Undersecretary of State for
Economic Affairs).
,3 See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 3 (statement by Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary
of Commerce).
14 See infra notes 63-65.
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to impair national security. 5 These reduced powers became law as
section 5021 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988.16
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Throughout its history, the United States has consistently wel-
comed foreign investors into the U.S. economy.' 7 The United States
has achieved the most open investment policy in the world by
following the premise that the lack of barriers and other distortive
measures against foreign capital and investment allows the world
economy to function best. 8 The policy of generally unrestricted
capital flows has been defended as sound economic theory by the
overwhelming number of American officials from Alexander
Hamilton 9 to present-day government officials. 20 Proponents of
11 See H.R. CONF. REp. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 338 (§ 721(c)).
16 50 U.S.C. § 721.
17 See generally Vagts, The Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal Res-
traints on Foreign Enterprise, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1491-94 (1961). See also Hearings
of 1975, supra note 3, at 25 (President Ford described discrimination towards foreign
investment as "totally contrary to American tradition and repugnant to American
principles").
IS See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 19:
International investment plays a vital role in the world economy, spurring
growth, expanding employment, introducing new technology and improv[ing]
productivity. Any country following an open policy, not just the United States,
accrues these benefits.
(Statement of Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce).
See also Hearings of 1975, supra note 3, at 27 (statement of Charles W. Robinson,
Undersecretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State).
19 See Vagts, The Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal Restraints of
Foreign Enterprise, 74 HAsv. L. REv. at 1492 (quoting 3 ANNALs OF CONG. 994 (1791)):
It is not impossible that there may be persons disposed to look with a jealous
eye on the introduction of foreign capital, as if it were an instrument to
deprive our own citizens of the profits of our own industry; but, perhaps,
there never could be a more unreasonable jealousy. Instead of being viewed
as a rival, it ought to be considered as a most valuable auxiliary, conducive
to put in motion a greater quantity of productive labor, and a greater portion
of useful enterprise, than could exist without it.
See Foreign Investment in the United States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 46 (1982)[hereinafter Foreign Investment in 1982](statement of
Marc E. Leland, Assistant Secretary of International Affairs, Department of Treasury).
See also Foreign Investment in the United States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Foreign Economic Policy of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2nd
Sess. 83 (1974)(statement of Peter M. Flanigan, Assistant to the President for Inter-
national Economic Affairs) (quoting President Nixon's April 10, 1973 message con-
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open investment argue that it has been in America's national security
interest to attract foreign investment. 21
Consistent with this domestic policy, the United States has worked
internationally to remove barriers to U.S. investment abroad main-
tained by its trading partners. 22 Nearly all countries have more
stringent investment regulations than the United States. 23 The United
Kingdom and West Germany, countries with relatively open in-
vestment policies, may easily disapprove foreign investment in their
domestic economies. 24 The country possessing some of the most
stringent investment regulations was Canada, with its since revoked
Foreign Investment Review Act of 1974 (FIRA). 25 To combat these
cerning the Trade Reform Act:". .. an open system for investment, one which eliminates
artificial incentives or impediments here and abroad, offers great promise for improved
prosperity throughout the world.").
21 See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 58-59 (testimony of Richard Darman, then
Deputy Secretary, now Secretary of the Treasury). (Keeping in line with prior admin-
istrations, Mr. Darman led the defense against restrictions on OPEC investment in the
mid-1970s. While such investment was unpopular at the time, the United States was a
net beneficiary of investment of the recycled dollars in the American economy.)
See also id. at 14 (statement of Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce). (It is
in America's self-interest to open other nations to American investment, rather than
to take the lead in erecting barriers to foreign investment.)
22 See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 19. See also Investment Hearings of 1974,
supra note 12, at 60.
13 See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 13:
Virtually every other nation has adopted explicit limitations on incoming foreign
direct investment. In general, the host country attempts to maximize its national
share of the benefits brought in by foriegn firms and to minimize the costs
to it.
See also Investment Hearings of 1974, supra note 12, at 92.
See generally E. Richardson, United States Policy Towards Foreign Investment: We
Can't Have It Both Ways, 4 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 281, 300-07, (1989) (summary
of screening practices of foreign direct investment).
See Foreign Investment in 1982, supra note 20, at 6. See also Acquisitions, supra
note 8, at 13. (The United States Trade Representative maintains a 100-page listing of
trade restrictions imposed by countries from Argentina to Zimbabwe. Generally, the
government reviews the investment on national security, cultural or economic grounds).
But see Investment Hearings of 1974, supra note 12, at 26 (statement of John Niehuss,
Assistant Director for Investment and Services, Council on International Economic
Policy):
A study in England entitled "The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment in
the United Kingdom"(the so-called Steuer Report) considered whether there
were rational grounds for limiting foreign investment in certain industries in
the U.K .....
The report concluded that: "We are not able to defend a list of special
key industries where a restrictive policy should be applied. (Military consid-
erations have not entered into our work)."
See Investment Hearings of 1974, supra note 12, at 85 (statement of Sen. Stev-
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foreign investment obstacles abroad the United States has requested,
when negotiating with foreign governments, that American firms
operating in their countries be accorded equal treatment with their
domestic investors. 26
Various means have been employed by the United States to ef-
fectuate its goal of global liberalization of investment regulation.2 7
First, to secure and grant national treatment to foreign investment,
the United States has entered into a network of bilateral treaties
of friendship, commerce and navigation (FCNs). 28 Second, it has
been a driving force behind the OECD's Code of Liberalization of
Capital Movement. 29 Third, it has been a forceful proponent at the
GATT Uruguay Round for the removal of investment restrictions. 0
In accordance with accepted international practice, the United States
restricts foreign investment in certain "sensitive" sectors of its economy."'
enson).
The following factors were required by the FIRA to be considered in evaluating
proposed foreign investments in Canada:
1) Effect of the proposed investment on the level and nature of economic
activity in Canada.
2) Degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the business.
3) Effect of the proposed investment on productivity, industrial efficiency,
and technological development in Canada.
4) Effect of the proposed investment on competition in Canada.
5) Compatibility of the proposed investment with national industrial and
economic policy.
The recently approved Free Trade Agreement shifts Canada from one of the most
restrictive markets to the economy most open to American investment.
See Hearings of 1975, supra note 3, at 26 (testimony of Jack Bennett, Under-
secretary for Monetary Affairs, Department. of Treasury).
27 See generally Investment Hearings of 1974, supra note 12.
See Hearings of 1975, supra note 3, at 29-30.
FCN's are designed to establish a framework within which mutually beneficial ec-
onomic relations between the two nations can take place. By ratification, the Senate
has supported the executive's view that these treaties are an important element in
promoting American interests and building a strong world economy.
FCN's protect American commerce and citizens abroad in the event of nationalization.
Rights assured to Americans in foreign lands are also assured in equal measure to
foreigners in the United States. These treaties do exempt certain areas from the national
treatment standard in order to conform with domestic laws existing at the time the
treaties were negotiated. Id.
29 See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 52; Hearings of 1975, supra note 3, at 28.
30 See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 8.
The United States is committed to keeping the pursuit of free access to investments
on the "front burner" in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Id. at 19.
11 See Hearings of 1975, supra note 3, at 25 (statement of Jack Bennett, Un-
dersecretary for Monetary Affairs, Department of Treasury). (The presence of barriers
1989]
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These include aviation,3 2 banking,33 communications,34 defense," energy,36
in some sensitive industries is consistent with various international obligations of
the United States under GATT.); see generally Rose, Special U.S. Rules Directly
Affecting Foreign Investment, 1 DICK. INT'L L. ANN. 59 (1982).
32 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (Federal Aviation Act of 1958).
Domestic air transport is limited to aircraft registered in the United States. To register
an aircraft, one must be a United States citizen, which is defined as an individual
citizen, a partnership of which each member is a United States citizen, or a domestic
corporation of which the president and 2/3 or more of the board are citizens and
75% of the stock of which is owned by United States citizens. Foreign air carriers
cannot acquire more that 1007% of an American air carrier.
11 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 72 (National Bank Act).
No restrictions exist on foreign ownership of national banks. However, such
ownership is inhibited by the requirement that a national bank's director be an
American citizen. See also 12 U.S.C. § 619 (Edge Act). Edge Act Corporations are
organized for the purpose of engaging in international banking or foreign operations.
A majority of the capital stock of an Edge Corporation must be held at all times
by a citizen of the United States. The directors must also be United States citizens.
3, See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-310 (Federal Communications Act of 1934).
A foreign government cannot hold a radio or TV station license. § 310(a). Direct
or indirect foreign holding of certain radio or TV station licenses is also prohibited.
§ 310(b). Exceptions to these prohibitions exist for foreign pilots (§ 303(L)(1));
amateur radio operators (§§ 301, 310(c)); and embassies (§ 305(d)).
See also 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-744 (Communications Satellite Act of 1962). Ownership
by foreign individuals or corporations of more than 20% of a company authorized
to develop commercial communication satellite systems is prohibited. § 734(d).
11 See Executive Orders 10450 and 10865, and Department of Defense Regulation
5220.22-R § 2, part 2 (Industrial Security Program). Except for subsidiaries of
Canadian and British firms, these regulations make it difficult for foreign-controlled
corporations to obtain security clearances to carry out classified contractual work
for the United States government.
36 See 16 U.S.C §§ 791(a)-829 (Federal Power Act).
This Act authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to issue licenses
for the construction, operation or maintenance of facilities for the development,
transmission and utilization of power on land and water over which the Federal
Government has control. § 797e (as amended Dec. 21, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-375,
Title II, § 212, 96 Stat. 1826 (1982)).
Licenses may be granted only to United States citizens and domestic corporations.
Moreover, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2133 (Atomic Energy Act of 1954) forbids foreigners
or any foreign corporation or entity that the Commission knows of from owning
a nuclear license. § 2133(d). Additionally, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (Natural Gas Act) prohibits
the import or export of natural gas by non-Americans unless authorized.
Applications to import or export natural gas require information concerning the
citizenship of a corporation's officers, but United States citizenship is not required.
18 C.F.R. § 153.11(1988).
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mining" and shipping) Additionally, the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) 9 permits the President to investigate
and nullify any foreign acquisition. 40 To do so, an extraordinary
foreign threat to American national or economic security must be
present, and the President must declare a national emergency. 4'
Concern over the possibility of sizeable foreign investments in
American firms by OPEC members in the early 1970s 42, and the
revelation of inadequacies in statistics and data-gathering procedures
on foreign investment 43 led to calls by Congress for better reporting
procedures and a comprehensive foreign investment policy.4 Various
Congressional plans appeared for two years45 before the International
" See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and Mineral Lands
Leasing Act). (Leases to explore and develop deposits of minerals on government land
may be obtained only by United States citizens or corporations; 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-23
(Mining of mineral deposits on federal land may only be undertaken by United States
citizens or those who have declared their intention to become citizens.); 43 U.S.C. §§
1331-1343 (Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act) (Allows for the leasing of oil, natural
gas and other mineral deposits in the submerged lands of the continental shelf only to
United States citizens, resident aliens or domestic corporations); see also 30 C.F.R. §
256.35(1988), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1025 (Geothermal Steam Act of 1970). (Leases for
the development and utilization of geothermal steam and associated resources may be
issued only to United States citizens and domestic corporations. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3260,
3280(1987)).
38 See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. §§ 861-889 (Merchant Marine Act of 1920), §§ 801-842
(Shipping Act of 1916), § 11 (Registry Act).
Ships used in domestic trade must be built in the United States and owned by United
States citizens. § 883.
3" 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982).
40 Id. § 1702(a)(1)(B). See also Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 5 (statement of Malcolm
Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce); (IEEPA allows the President in unusual circumstances
to deny any investment or compel the divestiture of foreign interest in an acquired
domestic company).
41 See 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1982).
42 See Investment Hearings of 1974, supra note 12, at 93-94.
,1 See S. REP. No. 910, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1974). The Department of Commerce
has not been able to develop methods to accurately measure real estate investments.
Information provided by the Securities and Exchange Commission on investments by
foreigners does not segregate data so as to identify foreign investors except as it relates
to cash tender offers.
" Id. at 3-5.
41 See, e.g., S. REP. 425, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)(Foreign Investment Act of
1975-Amends Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require notification by foreign investors
of proposed acquisitions of equity securities of United States companies); S. RFP. 2840,
93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974)(Foreign Investment Act of 1974-Requires the Secretaries
of Commerce and Treasury to undertake a comprehensive study of foreign direct and
portfolio investment in the United States and to report the results of the survey to
Congress).
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Investment Survey Act of 197646 became law. This act called for a
survey on the feasibility of establishing a system to monitor foreign
investment . 7
Prior to the adoption of the Survey Act, a legal mechanism to
review acquisitions in the United States by foreign companies was
created in the form of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS). 48 The Committee was created solely as a
monitoring body, 49 and had no legal power to block or modify
investments by foreign governments that it might find objectiona-
ble.5 0 Key areas examined in a CFIUS review include competition;
national security, defense and related areas; national energy policy
and impact; tax implications; and issues concerning the sensitivity
and transfer of technology.5 '
Direct foreign investment in the United States soared 62% in 1987
to a record $40.6 billion.5 2 By the close of 1987, foreigners held
over 5% of the capital stock in non-manufacturing industries and
nearly 10% in manufacturing industries." Congressional concern
over such statistics became more serious after Fujitsu, Ltd. proposed
- 22 U.S.C. § 3103 (1982).
47 Id. § 3103(d). This provision, as amended by the Act of October 26, 1981, requires
a new survey covering the years 1980-1987, and thereafter a survey every fifth year
concerning direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in the United States.
In addition, regular data collection is to be conducted to secure current information
on international capital flows. See also 15 C.F.R. § 806 (1988) and 31 C.F.R. § 129
(1988).
41 Exec. Order No. 11858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20263 (1975). Members of the Committee
include representatives from the Departments of Treasury, State, Commerce, and De-
fense, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and the Council of Economic
Advisors, with participants from the Departments of Justice, Energy, and the Interior,
and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Committee has the responsibility
for coordinating the implementation of United States policy towards foreign investment
in the United States. See Foreign Investment in 1982, supra note 20, at 47.
49 See Foreign Investment in 1982, supra note 20, at 47.
-o See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 20. The Committee has no authority to block
a deal, but it can quickly analyze the deal's potential effects, and, where appropriate,
bring the deal to the attention of the Economic Policy Council; Foreign Investment in
1982, supra note 20, at 47. The Committee, in theory, could review any foreign
investment in the United States, but in practice, it has limited its review to government-
controlled investments. TECrNOLOGY ACT, supra note 1, at 5.
11 See Foreign Investment in 1982, supra note 20, at 48.
12 See Koretz, The Buying of America: Should We Be Worried?, Bus. WK., May
9, 1988, at 36.
11 Id. Between 1984 and 1987, however, United States investment overseas increased
$84.4 billion, almost exactly the amount of the increase in foreign investment in the
United States during the same three year period. Id.
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purchasing an 80076 share of Fairchild Semiconductors Corporation
in January 1987.1 4 This proposed purchase raised a number of
national security concerns and also raised questions as to whether
the federal government possessed adequate authority to prevent such
an acquisition."
Congressional response began with Senator Exon's National Se-
curity and Essential Commerce Amendment to Senate Bill 907, the
Technology Competitiveness Act of 1987.56 As reported5 7 the bill
provided for investigation by the Secretary of Commerce of the
effects on American national security and essential commerce of
foreign mergers, acquisitions and takeovers.18 Within 45 days of
receiving a request to investigate59, the Secretary must report to the
President, who may restrict, suspend or prohibit the acquisition. 60
The Senate adopted Bill 142061 as an amendment in the nature of
a substitute to House Resolution 3, the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act passed by the House. 62
A Congressional conference committee met to resolve the conflicts
between provisions of H.R. 3 and S. 1420.63 The compromise reached 64
14 See TECHNOLOGY ACT, supra note 1, at 5.
55 Id.
6 Id. at 6. S. Res. 907 was introduced by Senators Hollings and Riegle on April
3, 1987. Senator Exon's Amendment was reported favorably with S. Res. 907 on June
16, 1987. Id.
17 See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 2. As originally drafted, the Amendment granted
the President discretionary authority to review and act upon foreign takeovers, mergers,
acquisitions, joint ventures and licensing agreements that threaten the national security
or essential commerce of the United States. The President was to consider the economic
welfare of the individual industry, the impact of the proposed business activity upon
employment, and the likelihood of resulting loss of skills or governmental revenues.
Id. at 11. The legislation was attacked as being overly broad because it covered joint
ventures and licensing agreements. Id. at 51.
" See TECHNOLOGY ACT, supra note 1, at 24-25 (§ 603(a)).
Id. at 25 (§ 603(c)).
'o Id. (§ 603(d)).
61 See 134 Cong. Rec. S10,595 (daily ed. August 2, 1988). S. Res. 1420 was the
vehicle for Senate debate on nine trade and competitiveness bills, including S. Res.
907. S. Res. 1420 was adopted by the Senate on July 21, 1987. Section 603 remained
in the same form as when it was reported from the Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation. Id.
6 Id. See H.R. CoNr. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 924 (1988). (The
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, H.R. Res. 3, contained § 905 which resembled
the Exon Amendment as originally offered in the Committee of Commerce, Science
and Transportation. It similarly encompassed mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures,
licensing and takeovers.)
63 See Rockwell, Trade Conferees Reach Accord On a Key Item, J. of Com. and
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applies only to mergers, acquisitions and takeovers. Under this
compromise, the President may suspend or prohibit foreign invest-
ment so that such investment would not threaten to impair national
security. 65 The President may only exercise this authority if evidence
suggests that such foreign control would impair national security or
if current law does not provide adequate protection. 66 Factors to
be considered by the President in making this determination include
domestic production needs for defense requirements; availability of
products, technology, materials and services to meet defense re-
quirements; and control of domestic industries by foreigners as it
affects the United States' capabilities to meet the requirements of
national security. 67 Both houses quickly adopted the conference com-
mittee's version 68 and the bill became law on August 23, 1988.69 To
fully implement section 5021, the Department of Treasury released
proposed regulations on July 5, 1989. 70
Comm'l., March 28, 1988, at IA.
The final version agreed upon by the conference committee was shaped by a com-
promise between the conferees and the Reagan Administration. In return for support
of a more narrow final version of the Exon Amendment, the conferees deleted from
the bill a highly controversial disclosure proposal, known as the Bryant Alternative,
from the bill. The Bryant Alternative called for requiring foreign firms to register with
the federal government if they held 5% or more of any United States property worth
$5 million or more. If holdings were over 25% and the enterprise had at least $20
million in assets, a provision requiring disclosure of financial data such as sales and
assets would have been triggered.
1, See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 338(§ 721(a)).
65 Id. (§ 721(c)).
Id. (§ 721(d)).
617 Id. at 338-39 (§ 721(e)). Despite this list of factors, both the statute and the
Conference Report lacked a definition of "national security." 54 Fed. Reg. 29,746
(July 14, 1989).
61 See 134 Cong. Rec. S10,595 (daily ed. August 2, 1988). The conference committee's
version of H.R. Res. 3 passed the House on April 21, 1988 and the Senate on April
27, 1988. President Reagan vetoed H.R. Res. 3 on May 24, 1988 with the House
overriding the President's veto the same day. The Senate failed to override the Pres-
idential veto on June 8, 1988. A revised form of the bill, H.R. 4848, was adopted by
the House on July 13, 1988 and the Senate on August 2, 1988. H.R. 4848 contained
identical language to that of the conference committee's final version of the Exon
Amendment. Id.; 134 Cong. Rec. H5,525 (daily ed. July 13, 1988)(statement by Rep.
Roukema). (H.R. 4848 is identical to H.R. 3 except for the elimination of the plant
closing notification requirement and the export of Alaskan oil provisions).
6 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, Title V
§ 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425-26(1988).
70 See 54 Fed. Reg. 29,744 (July 14, 1989) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 800);
see generally Skitol & Nash, 'National Security' and Foreign Takeovers in the United
States, Fin. Times, Aug. 31, 1989, at 27 (general description of the proposed regulations);
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II. ANALYSIS
The policy justification behind section 5021 is the belief that the
federal government needs more explicit authority to review acqui-
sitions of American companies by foreign entities, in order to ensure
that United States national security is not threatened. 7 However,
the scope of section 5021 is limited to mergers, acquisitions and
takeovers which would result in foreign control of an American
company.7 2 A threshold of 10% ownership by a foreign individual
or institution determines the existence of "control" over a com-
pany,73 thus distinguishing foreign "direct investment" from a mere
"portfolio investment". 74 The importance of this distinction lies in
Bellow & Holmer, Exon-Florio Regs Give President Authority to Block Takeovers,
Nat'l L.J., Aug. 28, 1989, at 22; but see Riddell, The Task of Matching Sense and
Sensibility, Fin. Times, Sept. 15, 1989, at 18 (arguing that the rules are so discretionary
and indefinite that there can be no clear title to property acquired by foreign investors);
U.S. Warning to Foreign Investors, Fin. Times, July 19, 1989, at 3 (criticizing the
vagueness of the regulation).
The regulations state that parties to a section 5021 acquisition may submit "voluntary
notice" of the proposed or completed acquisition to the CFIUS. A preliminary decision
may then be rendered as to whether a full investigation is required. See 54 Fed. Reg.
29,753 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 800.401).
The scope of section 5021 has been expanded by the proposals to include joint
ventures acquiring businesses. Id. at 29,752 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 800.301).
However, the regulations did not include a definition of "national security." They
did provide some guidance as to what the term encompasses. Companies providing
"products or key technologies essential to the U.S. defense industrial base" do receive
section 5021 protection, whereas companies providing products or services, such as toys
and games, food products, hotels and restaurants, and legal services, do not. Id. at
29,746.
Additionally, the proposed regulations did not include provisions designed to limit
the potential for abuse of section 5021 as a defensive mechanism to hostile takeovers.
See Eizenstat & Fullerton, Crying 'Wolf' on Takeovers, Nat'l L. J. July 24, 1989, at
13 (arguing for the inclusion of such provisions).
7, See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 12; TECHNOLOGY ACT, supra note 1, at 6.
72 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170; but see 54 Fed. Reg. 29,752 (1989) (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. § 800.301) (proposed July 5, 1989). (Joint ventures would be considered an
acquisition if the joint venture involved the acquisition of a business.)
13 See 22 U.S.C. § 3102(10); 15 C.F.R. § 806.15 (1988). ("Foreign Direct Investment
in the United States" means the ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one
foreign person of 10% or more of the voting securities of an incorporated United
States business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated United States
business enterprise, including a branch.); see also 54 Fed. Reg. 29,752 (1989) (to be
codified at 31 C.F.R. § 800.302) (proposed July 5, 1989). (Purchasing 10% or less of
a company's outstanding voting securities is not considered an acquisition.)
74 See 22 U.S.C. § 3102(1l)("Portfolio investment" is defined as any investment
which is not a direct investment); Int'l Trade Admin., Dep't. of Commerce, United
States Trade: Performance in 1987, at 54 (1988)(portfolio investments include stocks,
bonds, bank deposits, loans and annuities).
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the fact that only 16% of all foreign-owned assets in the United
States qualify under this test as direct investments. 7 Section 5021's
inapplicability to portfolio investment review by the President is a
continuation of the nation's longstanding policy of open investment.
The section's mechanism for intervention into foreign direct in-
vestment, however, is nothing more than a xenophobic reaction.
The new statute will chill both inbound and outbound foreign in-
vestment, will adversely affect American efforts to reduce other
nations' investment barriers, and will overshadow current, inter-
nationally accepted, protective legislation.
This congressional xenophobia was a prime reason for Fujitsu,
Ltd. withdrawing its offer for Fairchild Semiconductors. Fairchild's
parent company, Schlumberger, and Pentagon officials both agreed
that the real motivation behind section 5021 was concern over Ja-
pan's growing edge in the semiconductor field. 76 Ironically, Fairchild
was already under foreign ownership, 77 as Schlumberger is a Paris-
based corporation. 71
The post-World War II suspicion in the United States of foreign
direct investment in key American national security industries by
Japanese investors was exacerbated by Toshiba's 1987 sale of defense
secrets to the Soviets. 79 In contrast to its position regarding the
Japanese, the Pentagon has undertaken no efforts recently to stop
British and French firms from investing in defense-related compa-
nies.80
71 See Int'l. Trade Admin., Dep't. of Commerce, United States Trade: Performance
in 1987, at 59 (The total breakdown of foreign assets in the United States: foreign
private assets in U.S. banks-36%, foreign private holdings of U.S. stocks and bonds-
23%, foreign official and private holdings of U.S. Government securities-25%, and
foreign direct investment-16%); see also Hearings of 1975, supra note 3, at 22 (statement
of Jack Bennett, Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs, Department of Treasury). (The
16% foreign direct investment figure would be less if the old FDI threshold of 25%
ownership was not reduced on January 1, 1975).
76 See Mitchell, Pentagon Eases Stand Against Foreign Stakes in U.S. Defense Firms,
Wall St. J., April 28, 1988, at 1, 20, col. 2 (Eastern ed.)[hereinafter Pentagon Eases
Stand]. (A few months after Fujitsu's $200 to $225 million offer was withdrawn, the
government allowed Fairchild's sale to National Semiconductor Corp., of Santa Clara,
California, for just $120 million.); see also Bogdanich, Schlumberger Posts $2.18 Billion
Loss for Fourth Quarter, Maintains Dividend, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1987, at 3, col.
1 (Eastern ed.). (Fairchild was accounted as a discontinued operation because of the
then pending sale to Fujitsu. Schlumberger announced an extraordinary loss of $363
million in the fourth quarter due to Fairchild's discontinued operations.)
" See Pentagon Eases Stand, supra note 76, at 20, col. 2.
78 Id.
79 Id.
Id. at 1, col. 6. For example, in 1987, British Aerospace bought a 41% stake in
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An examination of the first four instances in which section 5021
was applied affirms this theory of an American paranoia of the
Japanese. Only the third CFIUS investigation, involving an agree-
ment by Japan's Tokuyama Soda Co. to acquire General Ceramics,
Inc. of New Jersey, resulted in an adverse determination."1 The
remaining investigations, involving German,8 2 Luxembourg 3 and
Swedish-Swiss 8 4 companies, received favorable CFIUS recommen-
dations.85
Alarmingly, a recent poll suggests that the American public is
worried about foreign investment. Seventy-eight percent of the res-
Reflectone, Inc., a Tampa, Florida maker of flight simulators and information systems.
Plessey recently bought Sippican Inc., a Marion, Massachusetts maker of ocean-research
and scientific instruments. Other foreign companies seeking United States defense stakes
include Paris-based Thomson CSF, Ferranti PLC, General Electric PLC and United
Scientific Holdings PLC of the United Kingdom.
11 See U.S. Blocks Japanese from Buying N.J. Firm; Nuclear Contract Cited, Atlanta
J. and Const., April 18, 1989, at B6. The Energy Deparment objected because of
classified work by General Ceramics at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant.
Beryllium ceramics, among the products produced by General Ceramics at the nuclear
plant, are a component in electronic circuits used within nuclear weapons. Id. A revised
offer, excluding the sensitive unit, was later approved by the CFIUS. See Riddell, The
Task of Matching Sense and Sensibilities, Fin. Times, Sept. 15, 1989, at 18.
"I See Reid & Priest International Business Transaction Newsletter, June 1989, at
1. (The investigation involved the acquisition by Huels A.G., of West Germany, of
Monsanto Electronic Materials Co., a United States manufacturer of silicon wafers.).
The CFIUS investigated the silicon wafer industry and examined how Monsanto's
sale would affect the reliability of supply, technology transfer and the relationship
Monsanto possesses with SEMATEC, the semiconductor industry research consortium.
Id.
83 Id. This involved the Luxembourg investment company Minorco's bid to purchase
Consolidated Gold Fields, a British firm owning 49% of a leading U.S. gold mining
firm.
The investigation resulted from initial concerns relating to Minorco's South African
control and the possibility of a concentration of stategic materials in South African
hands. The CFIUS determined that U.S. strategic stockpiles, production capabilities
and current inventories of these minerals would be sufficient to meet U.S. needs. Id.
14 See Bush Lets Swiss Firm Buy Westinghouse's Joint-Venture Stake, Wall St. J.,
May 18, 1989, at B2 col. 2 (Eastern ed.). The Swedish-Swiss electrical engineering firm
Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. sought to acquire Westinghouse's 55% interest in the two
companies' joint venture Westinghouse-ABB Power T&D Co..
Certain governmental agencies voiced concern that the sale could result in a reduction
in the availability of high-powered electrical transmission equipment, the very equipment
produced by Westinghouse-ABB Power. Asea Brown Boveri's confirmation of its
intention to continue manufacturing the equipment in the U.S. after the sale resulted
in the CFIUS favorable determination. Id.
11 But see Riddell, The Task of Matching Sense and Sensibilities, Fin. Times, Sept.
15, 1989, at 18.
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pondents favored laws to curb such investment, 6 and a hefty 40o
of those sampled wanted the government to ban further foreign
investment altogether. s7 In terms of nationality, British investors
were considered the most trustworthy business partners for the
United States."8 Despite recent fears that the Japanese are buying
up the United States, Commerce Department statistics show that
the Japanese are not the largest nor even the second largest investors
in the United States in total dollar value of investments. Until 1988,
both the British ($102 billion) and the Dutch ($49 billion) have
consistently undertaken more total direct investment in the United
States than have the Japanese ($53 billion)., 9
The issue of foreign investment in the United States was hotly
contested in the recent 1988 presidential campaign. Representative
Richard A. Gephardt, a major proponent during his bid for the
Democratic presidential nomination of protectionism against the
Japanese, recently called for a free-trade agreement between the
United States and the European Economic Community,9" while still
adhering to his earlier views regarding the Japanese. 91 In the last
6 See Mossberg, Most Americans Favor Laws to Limit Foreign Investment in U.S.,
Poll Finds, Wall St. J., March 8, 1988, at 60, col. 6 (Eastern ed.). (Seventy-eight
percent of the Americans polled said they favor a law to limit the extent of foreign
investment in the United States.) World News Tonight (ABC television broadcast, Oct.
31, 1988) (transcript on file at University of Georgia Law School Library).
17 See Mossberg, Most Americans Favor Laws to Limit Foreign Investment in U.S.,
Poll Finds, Wall St. J., March 8, 1988, at 60, col. 6 (Eastern ed.). (While 400% supported
a ban, 54%V0 opposed any such action).
Id. (Thirty-five percent chose the British as opposed to twenty-seven percent for
the Japanese. A poll of 100 top public officials and Wall Street and business leaders
chose the British thirty-four percent to eighteen percent over the Japanese); see also
And Never the Twain Shall Meet, Tim EcoNoMisT, Aug. 19, 1989, at 15 (By 3 to 1,
Americans say they now see Japan as a greater threat than the Soviet Union).
See Dep't. of Commerce, 69 Survey of Current Business 48 (June 1989). (All
figures are as of the end of 1988. Other major investors in the United States include
Canada with $27 billion, West Germany with $24 billion and Switzerland with $16
billion).90 See Farnsworth, U.S. Explores Another '92 European Expansion, N. Y. Times,
Nov. 4, 1988, at A22 (another sign of the new focus on Europe was the call last
month by Rep. Gephardt for a free-trade arrangement between the U.S. and the
E.E.C.); Address by Rep. Richard A. Gephardt, George Washington University Inter-
national Law Society 8 (Oct. 12, 1988). (Transcript on file at University of Georgia
Law School Library). (Best chance for successful bilateral negotiations are with countries
culturally, socially and economically like the U.S. Therefore, it would make some sense
to start the next bilateral negotiations with the E.E.C..)
91 Address by Rep. Richard A. Gephardt, George Washington University Interna-
tional Law Society, at 2 (Oct. 12, 1988).
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weeks before the November election, then-Vice President Bush crit-
icized Governor Dukakis for trying to "incite fear of foreigners as
a cheap means of winning a few votes." ' 92 Xenophobia, moreover,
is not solely an American problem; 93 scholars have lamented the
recurrence of this phenomenon both in the United States and abroad. 94
The effect of section 5021 of the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988 will be a significant chilling of both foreign
direct investment into the United States and of American efforts to
invest abroad. In this sense, the Act may be compared to Canada's
now-abandoned Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA). 95 Enact-
ment of the FIRA did not just chill foreign investment into Canada,
it put direct investment into a "deep freeze" .96 This negative result
occurred despite the FIRA's "optional" applicability, a status much
like that argued for section 5021 by its proponents. 97 An investigation
or possible ban on foreign investment authorized under section 5021
would substantially affect investments both at the time of the
investigation98 and in the future. 99 Equally significant is the possi-
bility of foreign retaliation against American direct investment
abroad.' °0 United States holdings of assets abroad totals $1.07 tril-
92 See ABC World News Tonight television broadcast, Oct. 31, 1988.
91 See Investment Hearings of 1974, supra note 12, at 113 (statement of Charles P.
Kindleberger, Ford Professor of Economics, Mass. Institute of Technology).
I Id. at 115; see also Hearings of 1975, supra note 3, at 247 (statement of Ian
MacGregor, Chairman of American Express Inc.).
I' See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 7 (statement of Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary
of Commerce).
Id. (after seeing the results of FIRA, the Canadians repealed much of it).
I Compare Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 16 (statement of Malcolm Baldrige,
Secretary of Commerce; the Canadians argued that they would keep the Act, but would
not use it, or would only use it in certain cases.) with Id. at 10 (statement of Senator
Exon)(the Exon Amendment is not mandatory, it is strictly discretionary).
98 Id. at 50 (statement of Robert McNeill, Executive Vice Chairman, Emergency
Committee for American Trade). (The fact that an investigation was made could have
a substantial chilling effect on foreign direct investment).
Id. at 55 (statement of Richard Darman, former Deputy Secretary of Treasury):
Once it becomes a pattern that investments are turned down by a government,
a whole host of investment ideas that are in the germination stage in the
investing community that might be potential investments in a given country
are shut off, because it is not worth the time to invest in the effort to put
the deal together for that country.
See also Id. at 47 (such barriers would have an adverse effect on United States interest
rates and growth, to the extent that they discourage further investment); Id. at 48. (It
is counterproductive, from the standpoint of an interest in the U.S. balance-of-payments
problem, to be closing the international investment regime in exactly the historical
context where the United States may have most to gain by opening it).
o See supra note 12.
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lion, $260 billion of which is in the form of direct investment.' 10
The United States is much more exposed to, and has more to lose
from, barriers and penalties on investment than any other country. 0 2
Two-thirds of the United States'- economy is now comprised of
service industries. 13 A service economy must rely increasingly on
receipts from royalties and investments abroad. °4 Numerous United
States multinational companies and organizations whose investments
and royalty repatriations would be affected by foreign retaliation
vigorously opposed section 5021.105
A second substantial effect of section 5021 is its adverse effect
on efforts to reduce other nations' already-existing investment bar-
10, See Int'l Trade Admin., Dep't. of Commerce, United States Trade: Performance
in 1987, at 58-59. Almost one half of the $1.07 trillion invested abroad is in the form
of loans and other investments by U.S. banks; direct investment totalled one fourth
and U.S. Government assets like official reserves, stocks and bonds constitute the
remaining quarter. The official $260 billion book value figure for U.S. direct investment
abroad may substantially understate its actual market value. A large portion of this
investment consists of investments made 20 or 30 years ago and is recorded at the
transaction costs of that time. This is in contrast to much of the foreign direct investment
made in the United States which has occurred primarily in the recent past. Real
appreciation in the value of American investments abroad and significant inflation
during the 1970's make the actual market value of U.S. investments abroad much
higher than the recorded historical costs reflected in official statistics.
, See Riddell, The Task of Matching Sense and Sensibility, Fin. Times, Sept. 15,
1989, at 18. (Morgan Guaranty estimates that the current market value of American
foreign direct investment abroad is probably three times its book value); see also
Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 7 (statement of Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Com-
merce)(three million Americans are working today as a result of foreign investment);
Investment Hearings of 1974, supra note 12, at 61 (statement of William Casey,
Underseretary of State for Economic Affairs).
103 See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 60 (statement of Richard Darman, former
Deputy Secretary, now Secretary of the Treasury).
104 See Investment Hearings of 1974, supra note 12, at 61 (statement of William
Casey, Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs):
To balance off [multilateral enterprise] investments, we must export securities
and bring in foreign investments to the United States.
As a country which faces increasing needs for resources of energy and raw
materials from abroad, we will have to invest abroad and increase the flow
of investment earnings to justify that investment, and to balance off that
investment we will have to attract investments from abroad. We will have to
maintain and strengthen our ability to raise capital throughout the world as
well as at home.
105 See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 66,67,72,75. (Letters were received from British
Petroleum, North America Inc.; Ciba-Geigy Corporation; the Business Roundtable and
the United States Council for International Business. The proposal would invite retal-
iation by countries which currently welcome investment by multinational companies,
including many of the largest American corporations.)
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riers. 1°6 First, it undermines America's bargaining position at the
GATT Uruguay Rounds. 0 7 The Act is contrary to one of the im-
portant principles the United States is advocating at GATT, that
of the removal by countries of their investment restrictions.'08 The
Reagan Administration strongly opposed any measure that would
send to America's trading partners a signal that the United States
was backing away from its traditional position of leadership on this
issue. 10 9 Second, section 5021 runs counter to United States obli-
gations under a number of friendship, commerce and navigation
treaties (FCNs) and the OECD Capital Movements Code and Dec-
laration on National Treatment." 0 Third, it conflicts with the mes-
sage conveyed by the United States in debt negotiations with
developing countries like Brazil and Mexico."' These developing
countries are vitally important to the United States' economic future
because of their potential as future markets for American goods
and investment opportunities for American capital. "12 Fourth, efforts
to revitalize stagnant industries and regions in the United States will
be retarded by any measures that interfere with the direct investment
from abroad that has fueled many of these efforts." 3
, See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 75. (Letter from Abraham Katz, President,
United States Council for International Business).
"I Id. at 8 (statement of Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce); Id. at 52
(statement of Robert McNeill, Executive Vice Chairman of the Emergency Committee
for American Trade).
101 Id. at 50.
109 Id. at 19; 133 Cong. Rec. S8,740 (daily ed. June 25, 1987) (the bill's undermining
of investment initiatives in GATT was cited as one reason for initial Administration
opposition to Sen. Exon's amendment).
110 See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 51-52 (statement of Robert McNeill, Executive
Vice Chairman, Emergency Committee for American Trade) (stating that § 5021 does
not appear to have been adequately examined with respect to its relationship and effect
on existing United States treaty obligations, such as FCN's, OECD Codes and Dec-
larations and bilateral investment treaties); Id. at 66 (letter from British Petroleum,
North America, Inc.); 133 Cong. Rec. S8740 (daily ed. June 25, 1987).
"I See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 7 (statement of Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary
of Commerce); Id. at 47 (statement of Richard Darman, former Deputy Secretary of
Treaury); Murray, Reagan's Legacy: America For Sale, Wall St. J., Feb. 29, 1988, at
1, col. 6 (Eastern ed.).
"2 See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 54 (statement of Robert McNeill, Executive
Vice Chairman, Emergency Committee for American Trade).
-3 See Hicks, The Takeover of American Industry, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1989,
section 3, at 1 (examples include Firestone, National Steel, Inmont and General Tire).
Moreover, foreign ownership breathes new life into stagnant companies and helps
the economy as a result. Id. at 9 (statement by economist Michael Dertouzos, chairman
of the commission on Industrial Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
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The aforementioned negative effects of section 5021 need not be
suffered, since already-existing mechanisms sufficiently protect the
American economy against harmful foreign investment, without
threatening the same problems as section 5021 .114 First, the CFIUS
already exists to protect national security by analyzing certain pro-
posed mergers and acquisitions, and reporting to the Economic
Policy Council if a proposed transaction requires further scrutiny." 5
Second, the powers granted to the President in section 5021 merely
repeat those vdsted in him under the IEEPA.1 6 Moreover, section
5021 confers authority on the President to ban an acquisition only
after the President determines that the IEEPA is an insufficient
means with which to protect national security." 7 Third, there already
exist sectoral controls over vital national industries such as aviation,
banking, communications, defense, energy, mining and shipping,
which controls are consistent with international custom. 1 8 Fourth,
existing regulations allow the government to require foreign pur-
chasers to divest themselves of particularly sensitive operations or
permit their acquisitions to be operated as a blind trust. 119
Equally important, the United States economy would not continue to expand without
foreign investment.
'Like it or not, we have no choice but to accept foreign investment: a major
reversal could trigger a sharp, recession and decline in our standard of living,'
said Norman J. Glickman and Douglas P. Woodward in THE NEW COMPET-
rroRs, their new book about foreign investment in the American economy.
'The withdrawal or slowdown of foreign capital inflows would choke off the
funds needed to finance continued domestic growth. Interest rates would
inevitably rise. Any policy that severely restricts foreign investment would be
counterproductive.' Id.
14 See Acquisitions supra note 8, at 76 (etter from John Whitehead, Acting Assistant
Secretary of State). (Authority currently exists to protect United States national security
through restrictions in special sectors of the economy, Presidential authority under
IEEPA and the presence of the CFIUS); Id. at 11 (statement of Malcolm Baldrige,
Secretary of Commerce).
"I Id. at 19-20; 133 Cong. Rec. S8,740 (daily ed. June 25, 1987). (The government
argued that § 5021 duplicates investigatory actions of the CFIUS); but see Foreign
Investment in 1982, supra note 20, at 4-5 (statement of Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal)
(asserting that CFIUS is a "paper tiger" which lacks the power and purpose to properly
protect American interests).
116 See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 14 (statement of Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary
of Commerce). See also supra notes 39-41 (background information on IEEPA).
117 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2); 54 Fed. Reg. 29,755 (1989) (to be codified at
31 C.F.R. § 800.601) (proposed July 5, 1989).
"i See Acquisitions, supra note 8, at 5 (statement of Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary
of Commerce); see also supra notes 31-38 (background information on these sectoral
controls).
"9 See Pentagon Eases Stand, supra note 75, at 20, col. 3; see also Acquisitions,
supra note 8, at 20 (statement of Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Unlike other provisions contained in the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, section 5021, a product of discrimi-
natory attitudes, is an unnecessary overreaction to a perceived danger
which existing controls 120 can adequately remedy. The proposed
Fujitsu purchase of Fairchild Semiconductor was the only example
of this alleged danger of foreign encroachment specifically cited in
both the subcommittee hearings1 2' and the final report.' 2  Had the
sale been approved, all other factors remaining the same, no true
loss of national autonomy or security would have occurred.' 23 In-
stead, an unnecessary law was enacted that confers no additional
authority on the President and will result solely in a disadvantageous
loss of foreign confidence in the United States by its trading partners.
Unfortunately, most nations will only observe the statute's billowing
smoke of protectionism without realizing that the fire behind it is
nothing more than the single glowing ember of the Fujitsu episode.
See Pentagon Eases Stand, supra note 75, at 20, col. 2. The Pentagon, citing
national security, denied Fujitsu's proposed purchase of Fairchild Semiconductor. The
Japanese then withdrew their offer before an antitrust determination on the acquisition
was released.
121 See generally Acquisitions, supra note 8; but see id. at 32 (statement by Robert
Mercer, Chief Executive Officer, Goodyear Tire & Rubber, stating that the Exon
Amendment would have saved Goodyear from the hostile takeover attempt by British
financier Sir James Goldsmith. However, Mr. Mercer admitted the problem faced by
Goodyear would have been the same no matter whether it was Goldsmith or American
Carl Ichan behind the bid).
'2 See TECHNOLOGY ACT, supra note 1, at 5.
121 See Investment Hearings of 1974, supra note 12, at 26 (letter from Peter Flanigan,
Executive Director, Council on International Economic Policy, White House):
A study in England entitled "The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment in
the United Kingdom" (the so-called Steuer Report) concluded that:
'In general, our search for concrete cases of loss of national autonomy
through inward investment produced very little. Only the most minor indi-
cations were found here and there. It is also the case that in many ways the
flow of inward investment increases the host country options. One important
way is through raising domestic income. And the fact that the foreign firm
is foreign, is here on sufference, and the possibility of exchange control, tend,
under present conditions at least, to make it more publicly accountable than
domestic firms.'
This quote points out an important fact which is often overlooked with
respect to foreign investment- i.e. the assets are under the control of the host
country which gives it tremendous residual control over the investment in
question. It is not the ownership which is important but what happens to the
product.
Id.; supra note 112.
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The adverse effects of section 5021 will be realized at the GATT
Uruguay Round negotiations. To reestablish the waning foreign trust
in America as a market, section 5021 should be repealed. This would
be a harmless and purely advantageous move on the part of the
United States. The elimination of section 5021 will not reduce the
United States' ability to control foreign direct investment in sensitive
industries, but it will restore the needed foreign confidence in the
United States as a market and will effectuate the GATT goal of an
open investment policy. Failure to do so invites needless retaliation
and barriers at the time America requires open investment and trade
to solve its budget and trade deficits.
Christopher J. Foreman
